On "Olmstead"

For a person with a disability to even use the ADA, he or she must adopt at least one of these three identities defined under the law, and must prove themselves disabled under ADA definitions. The case of Olmstea demonstrates that this can be a tricky task.

The Olmstead case (Olmstead v. L.C. 98 US 536, 7. ) distinguishes variation within the category of “mental disabilities” as well as demonstrating a common example of how individuals must assume a disabled identity in order to access the ADA. The plaintiffs in that case were individual women identified as having cognitive disabilities as well as psychological disabilities. Id. at 7. The women were described as having mental retardation: one has been also diagnosed with schizophrenia, and the other with a personality disorder. Both were voluntarily admitted to a hospital and confined for treatment in the psychiatric unit. The state agency providing the women treatment felt that the women could be placed in a community-based residential program, but they were not transferred, and the two remained in the hospital.

The women wanted to be in a community-based residential program, and they filed suit against the State of Georgia under Title II of the ADA. Georgia failed to place them in a community-based program after doctors deemed it appropriate. The District Court found the failure to place the women in a community program was discrimination based on their impairments. Id. at 9. That court held that unnecessary institutional segregation amounted to discrimination that cannot be justified by lack of funding. The court further held that immediate placement would not “fundamentally alter” the State’s practice and did not allow for a cost-based defense for the State. At the Supreme Court level, the issue was whether Georgia could use funding as a defense for not deinstitutionalizing a person with a disability.

The Supreme Court mostly upheld the District Court decision. This decision informed readings of the ADA by States, requiring that, under the ADA, states place persons with mental disabilities in community settings as opposed to institutions when the State’s treatment professionals have determined such placement is appropriate, the transfer is less restrictive, and not opposed by the individual. The Supreme Court differed from the lower court in holding that placement of an individual in a community-program depends on factoring in the State’s resources along with the needs of other individuals with mental disabilities who are receiving services.

This holding illustrated two things: the refusal of deinstitutionalization by a state agency is discrimination under Title II of the ADA; and it considers unjust segregation as a mode of discrimination. The case resulted in allowing State agencies to use budgetary short-falls as a defense when individuals desires to have placement in a community-based environment as opposed to an institution, though the court required clear evidence to demonstrate this.

To examine this case from the perspective of differing from the original spirit of the ADA, the plaintiffs only qualified for the programs involved because doctors deemed them so. Both women were diagnosed with their disability and later found to be qualified for a different program in order for their issues to even begin to seek relief under the ADA. This case highlights how the ADA is predisposed to rely on medicalized definitions of disability. A person with a disability must first demonstrate impairment before assuming the identity created by the ADA. Here, the identity was helpful to the plaintiffs and provided ADA access.